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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the opportunities and tensions generated by efforts to use conservationbased tourism as a catalyst for economic development. By exploring how historical legacies
position actors and influence relationships between them, characterizing the nature tourism sector
and its logic, and examining how liberalizing states are likely to engage with community-based
tourism. I situate community-based nature tourism ventures in a broader political economic
context. The paper draws from research on the Makuleke Region of Kruger National Park,
South Africa to illustrate how these factors influence prospects for community benefit from
protected area tourism. Like many other protected areas in Africa, contemporary dynamics
in the Makuleke Region are a product of dispossession, forced removal, and conservation.
The Makuleke, who consider the land their ancestral home, were forcibly removed in the late
1960s so that the land could be incorporated into Kruger National Park. They regained title in
1998, and have subsequently pursued economic development through conservation. While comanaging the Region with SANParks, the parastatal that manages all national protected areas,
the Makuleke have sought to develop a tourism initiative that will produce economic self reliance
and development. In adopting this strategy, the Makuleke are engaging with local, national, and
international political economies over which community actors have limited room for maneuver.
This case brings three factors to light. First, the legacy of fortress conservation may make it
more difficult for community actors to engage with their partners on an equal basis. Second,
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sectoral attributes of tourism pose special challenges to community based natural resource
management initiatives; it is not clear that tourism projects will produce substantial benefits. Third,
the coincidence of the shift to community based natural resource management with liberalization
and democratization has altered the landscape on which all conservation efforts are situated.
The confluence of these factors has created an environment in which state protected areas,
community controlled conservation areas, and private game parks are competing for domestic and
international tourist revenue. While nature tourism ventures hold substantial economic promise
for some communities, tourism is not a panacea. Actors engaged in community based natural
resource management initiatives should carefully assess the risks, challenges, and opportunities
posed by tourism ventures.
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Communities, Conservation, and
Tourism‐Based Development
Can Community‐Based Nature Tourism
Live Up to Its Promise?
Robin L. Turner 1
As community‐based approaches to natural resource management
have gained popularity in conservation circles, some advocates of this
approach have looked towards nature tourism as a means to ensure
that participating communities benefit from CBNRM. This paper ana‐
lyzes the opportunities and tensions generated by efforts to use con‐
servation‐based tourism as a catalyst for economic development. By
exploring how historical legacies position actors and influence rela‐
tionships between them, characterizing the nature tourism sector and
its logic, and examining how liberalizing states are likely to engage
with community‐based tourism. I situate community‐based nature
tourism ventures in a broader political economic context. The paper
draws from research on the Makuleke Region of Kruger National Park,
South Africa to illustrate how these factors influence prospects for
community benefit from protected area tourism. 2 For example, the Ma‐
kuleke’s interactions with conservation managers, donors and advo‐
cates, government bureaucrats, and private sector entrepreneurs are
structured by their relative poverty, limited technical expertise, and
secure title to a valued conservation area—and by tourism market
structures. While historical legacies of exclusion and dispossession and
market structures often disadvantage community initiatives, nature
tourism may have substantial promise in places where communities
have secure tenure or title to an area valued by private sector entre‐
preneurs. Realistic appraisal of nature tourism in community contexts
requires attention to the multiple political economies in which these ef‐
forts are embedded.

SITUATING COMMUNITY‐BASED
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Community‐based natural resource management (CBNRM) generally
refers to resource management practices in which people dependent
on those resources or affected by management practices are involved
in the management and exploitation of these resources. CBNRM usu‐
ally focuses on people in close proximity to the resources of concern;
these people constitute the “community” which is to be involved. In
CBNRM sites, the main actors usually include community representa‐
tives, conservation or development‐focused nongovernmental organi‐
zations, government agencies from environmental, parks, or land de‐
partments, a variety of international donors, and consultants. CBNRM
has gained support in conservation and development circles over the
last two decades, and CBNRM strategies are being implemented with
increasing frequency. Hulme and Murphree (2001) argue that this ap‐
proach became “almost a new orthodoxy” in development circles
during the 1990s.
Although there are many routes to CBNRM (see Barrow &
Murphree 2001), most initiatives begin with a decision by the govern‐
mental or private actors controlling a protected area to involve nearby
affected communities. In these cases, the extent of community in‐
volvement is largely within the control of these actors. In spite of am‐
ple rhetoric regarding “participation” in CBNRM plans and literature,
brief consultation with local communities appears to be much more
common than substantial involvement in decision‐making. In those
cases where communities do participate in decision‐making, the
agenda is often severely restricted. For example, proposals to use areas
for agriculture or manufacturing instead of conservation may not be
considered. When communities have secure title to the land, this may
increase their bargaining power with governmental and private actors
as the communities can use land title to secure a greater role in deci‐
sion‐making.
Community‐based natural resource management emerged from the
confluence of several factors. For close to a century, conservation ef‐
forts followed a “fortress conservation” model in which human activ‐
ity was viewed as intrinsically harmful to nature (Adams & Hulme
2001; Moore, Kosek & Pandian 2003; Nash 1973; Neumann 1998; Pe‐
luso 1993; Wells, Brandon & Hannah 1992). The model was deeply in‐

vested in a romantic European understanding of nature as fragile and
pristine. Conservationists therefore sought to exclude people from
nature by creating “protected areas,” reserves in which human resi‐
dence and consumptive activity (hunting, agriculture) was strictly
limited, but nature was subject to expert management. The term “for‐
tress” reflects the fences, fines, and coercion employed to restrict local
access to protected areas. Over time, the demonstrated failures of for‐
tress conservation to produce desired conservation outcomes lessened
support for this approach. Despite intense investment in policing pro‐
tected areas against the threat posed by local people and “poachers,”
who often were seen as interchangeable (Neumann 1997; Peluso 1993),
ecological conditions declined, and the number of threatened species
continued to rise. Fortress conservation also came under increasing
pressure from human rights and justice‐oriented critiques, which
questioned the moral basis for expropriation and exclusion in the
name of biodiversity (e.g., Geisler & Letsoalo 2000).
CBNRM thus arose as a response to two quite different critiques.
Proponents argue that community‐based management can provide
morally just conservation. For conservationists, CBNRM promises
better conservation outcomes: local involvement rather than removal
will protect the environment. For those concerned with justice, it is ar‐
gued that CBNRM is more democratic than centralized state control of
natural resources. Community benefit is the linchpin on which this
“win‐win” approach depends. If communities are involved in conser‐
vation and if they benefit from it, it is argued, they will comply with
restrictions on use and extraction. CBNRM is closely linked to devel‐
opment, narrowly understood in terms of improved material and eco‐
nomic well‐being. Since it is assumed that these communities do not
sufficiently value conservation in and for itself, substantial community
participation without development might threaten conservation.
There are many angles from which these justifications for CBNRM
could be and have been usefully critiqued—for example, it is far from
clear that local resource exploitation provides an adequate explanation
for species decline (Gibson 1999; Leader‐Williams 1990). In addition,
some conservationists doubt that community participation will im‐
prove outcomes (e.g., Spinage 1998). This paper focuses on the interac‐
tion between conservation‐based development and extra‐local political
economies. 3 As the Makuleke case illustrates, conservation‐based
development efforts bring the “communities” involved in CBNRM

Figure 1: Protected areas in contemporary South Africa. Source: Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, South Africa (undated).
Makuleke Region

into complex interactions with processes at several different spatial
scales in which they often have extremely limited room for maneuver.
My discussion of this case is based on interviews conducted with
community members, national parks officials, and other involved in‐
dividuals during 2002, 4 on archival research, 5 and on secondary litera‐
ture. This paper focuses on developments in the Makuleke Region
through August 2002 when interviews were completed.
The Makuleke Region constitutes about 24,000 hectares bounded by
the Luvuvhu, Limpopo, and Pafuri (Mutale) rivers. It is situated in the
northeastern corner of South Africa near the borders of Zimbabwe and
Mozambique (See Figures 1‐2). The Region is ecologically rich; it is
home to a wide range of flora and fauna, including impala, kudu,
leopards, buffalo, lions, deer, and many bird species. It also is located
along a wildlife migration route. The land includes floodplains, pans,
wetlands and riverine forest and bush. Many plants in the area, such
as the lala palm, have multiple subsistence and commercial uses (Har‐
ries 1987). The Thulamela ruins are of archeological, historical, and
cultural interest. In 2002, there were a few paved roads, but one had to
go off‐road or use dirt roads to access most of the area. Monetary

Figure 2: The Makuleke Region in Kruger Park. Located in the northernmost
part of the park, the region is bounded by the Limpopo River to the north, the
Pafuri River to the south, and the Levuvhu River to the east. Source: Adapted
from Carruthers (1995:102).

valuations for the land and existing infrastructure ranged from 20 to 70
million Rand (US $1.8 to $6.3 million 6 ) in 2000 (Koch & de Beer 2000).
Examination of the Makuleke case brings three factors to light. First,
the communities most likely to be targeted for CBNRM have been
particularly disadvantaged by the prior processes of conservation
through dispossession and the broader legacies of African colonialism
and South African apartheid. These legacies may make it more diffi‐
cult for community actors to engage with their partners on an equal
basis. Second, conservation‐based development is heavily reliant on
capitalist market strategies for success. In most cases, revenue gener‐
ated through tourism or other leisure spending is expected to provide
the resources for community benefit. Although employing a market‐
based strategy has some benefits, the sectoral attributes of tourism
pose special challenges to CBNRM initiatives, and it is not clear that
CBNRM tourism projects will produce substantial economic benefits. 7
Third, the coincidence of the shift to CBNRM with African economic
crisis, partial liberalization and democratization has altered the re‐
gional landscape on which all conservation efforts, private, state, and
community‐based are situated. These transformations within and be‐
yond the state may increase market competition and reduce the alter‐
natives for communities seeking development.

LEGACIES OF DISPOSSESSION
African conservation is deeply intertwined with land expropriation
and exclusion. As many scholars have documented, the creation of
protected areas frequently has involved forced relocation of people
long resident in those areas and the exclusion of nearby peoples from
access to these areas (Carruthers 1995; Neumann 1998). These practices
were widespread during the colonial and apartheid eras in South Af‐
rica (Ramutsindela 2003). Some contend that greenlining—placing
land under protected status, thereby restricting human residence and
use—continues to result in dispossession and the criminalization of
customary practices throughout the developing world (Geisler 2003;
Neumann 1998, 2002). The Makuleke Region is a product of this his‐
tory. 8
Harries (1987) estimates that the Makuleke region was settled 150
to 200 years ago by the Makuleke clan, a branch of the Maluleke clan.

Figure 3: Another view of the Makuleke Region. Boundary lines are the
Limpopo River (A‐C), Pafuri River (C‐D), and Levuvhu River (B‐F‐E). Letters
A‐G indicate the circumference of the land claim. All of this area was once
occupied by the Makuleke, but Makuleke residence was gradually limited to
the small location indicated on the map. Adapted from Makuleke Land Claim
Court documents (not dated).

Located along an established trade route known to Europeans and Af‐
ricans, the area was outside the scope of European settlement and
somewhat distant from indigenous state structures. By the 1890s, how‐
ever, the Makuleke people and the territory had been incorporated
into the white supremacist South African (Transvaal) Republic. 9 Over
the next eighty years, the Makuleke gradually lost effective access to
and control over the region’s resources as provincial and national gov‐
ernments claimed the territory, restricted the Makuleke to a small re‐
serve within the Region (Figure 3), and established protected areas
(Carruthers 1995; Harries 1987). This process culminated in the forced
removal of the Makuleke in 1969. The Makuleke were resettled in
Ntlhaveni, a newly established reserve for Tsonga‐speaking people lo‐
cated about 200 kilometers away. In 1971, most of the Makuleke Re‐
gion was incorporated into Kruger National Park, South Africa’s pre‐
mier national park (Figure 2); a small portion was incorporated into
the Madimbo Corridor, a military cordon sanitaire (Steenkamp 2001). 10

Forced removal to Ntlhaveni was accompanied by political and
economic changes. First, political authority within the homelands was
structured by “traditional” authorities as recognized by the Depart‐
ment of Bantu Affairs. At removal, the Makuleke chief was made a
“headman,” formally subordinate to Maluleke Chief Mhinga. Chief
Mhinga was complicit in the Makuleke’s removal, which gave him
authority over this related, but largely independent, clan (Harries
1987). Because recognized chiefs had considerable discretion over land
and revenue allocation, the formal status of the Makuleke chief had
material consequences. Secondly, removal brought a decisive shift in
the relative importance of subsistence agriculture versus wage labor.
The Makuleke were concentrated on a relatively small parcel of land,
comprising 5,000 hectares divided into three villages, and agricultural
plots could no longer be scattered. Ntlhaveni lacked the rich game,
wild fruits, lala palm, and fish of the Makuleke Region, so the Maku‐
leke had to adapt their farming practices to the different agricultural
conditions of the dry savannah. There were several crop failures dur‐
ing the first few years, and many men migrated so that they could earn
wages to purchase food. Wage labor became essential to survival, but
Ntlhaveni’s remote location limited employment opportunities to
nearby farms, Kruger Park, and migrant labor. The forced removal of
the Makuleke was part and parcel of the broader process through
which the majority of the South African population was restricted to a
small portion of the land, about 13 percent in the “African” case, and
the black rural population became dependent upon farm and migrant
labor for survival.
During the negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy,
property rights and land issues were a major issue of contention. The
National Party argued strongly for protection of private property
rights, which could entrench white claims to property acquired during
segregation and apartheid. The African National Congress sought to
facilitate land reform and restitution. Eventually, the parties agreed
that the new Bill of Rights would include protection for property, in‐
cluding a right to compensation for expropriation (Rugege 2004). The
Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution included provisions protecting
property, establishing a right to redress for those expropriated since
1913; and compelling the state to foster equitable access to land (Sec‐
tion 25). The new government then established a three‐pronged land
reform process including land restitution, land redistribution, and ten‐

ure reform. For the most part the government has sought to achieve
land reform through negotiation, using a willing buyer‐willing seller
approach, and progress has been slow. 11
With the passage of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 in 1994,
the Makuleke had the opportunity to reclaim their lost land. This Act
established the process through which individuals and groups de‐
prived of their land after June 1913 as a consequence of racially dis‐
criminatory laws could seek individual or collective restoration of lost
land, alternative land, or compensation. After learning of the Act, the
Makuleke filed a collective restitution claim, and established the Ma‐
kuleke Communal Property Association (CPA) as the legal vehicle to
pursue their land claim and receive title. The CPA membership in‐
cluded all individuals who had lived in the Makuleke Region and their
descendents, as well as individuals who had joined the Makuleke
community after removal. Representatives of the Makuleke then ne‐
gotiated with the National Parks Board (now SANParks) and other
government ministries. Three years after the claim was filed, the par‐
ties reached a settlement. In late 1998, Land Claims Court recognized
the settlement and ordered the transfer of title to the Makuleke Region
to the Makuleke CPA. 12 (Table 1 describes the resultant property rights
regime.) The court order marked the first successful settlement of a
land restitution claim involving a South African national park.
Although SANParks resisted the Makuleke’s land claim for most of
the negotiation process, the final resolution was portrayed as a “win‐
win solution.” For SANParks, the most important outcome may be the
retention of the Makuleke Region within Kruger Park. In fact, Kruger
Park grew slightly with the addition of the 3,000 hectares the Maku‐
leke reclaimed from the Madimbo Corridor. SANParks also gained a
formal commitment to continued conservation of the area, and the
ability to monitor and sometimes participate in Makuleke decision‐
making. The Restitution Agreement included the proviso that the Ma‐
kuleke Region would be administered as a contractual national park
for 20 to 50 years. 13 Since the resolution of the land claim, the Region
has been co‐managed by the Makuleke Communal Property Associa‐
tion (CPA) and SANParks, the parastatal that manages all national
protected areas (See Figure 4). Because the CPA does not possess suffi‐
cient conservation expertise or manpower to manage the region with‐
out assistance, SANParks is responsible for day‐to‐day conservation
management.

Table 1: The Distribution of Property Rights to the Makuleke Region
Right

Possessior

Restrictions

Alienation

Makuleke CPA can sell, alien‐
ate, or encumber the land.

SANP has pre‐emptive rights;
must be notified of intent to sell
& has first right of refusal

Access

The Makuleke CPA and com‐
munity members are entitled
to access

Subject to JMB policy

Permanent Resi‐
dence

‐

Not allowed, unless consistent
with conservation

Agriculture

‐

Not allowed

Land use

Makuleke CPA

Solely for conservation and as‐
sociated commercial activities

Use of Natural
Resources

Makuleke CPA may use sand,
stone, etc. for building and
other approved activities

JMB to set policy

Building Rights

Makuleke CPA can create
commercial facilities (e.g.
lodges); research facility; mu‐
seum; royal kraal

Must be consistent with conser‐
vation

Infrastructure

Makuleke CPA

SANP can use as necessary to
continue conservation man‐
agement

Subsurface Rights

State retains mineral resources;
mining and prospecting is
forbidden.

If state policy changes, State
must offer rights to the CPA at
a fair and reasonable price

Acronyms: JMB: Joint Management Board; SANP: South African National Parks; Maku‐
leke CPA: Makuleke Community Property Association

The Makuleke agreed to preserve the Makuleke Region’s status as a
conservation area early in the negotiation process. The commitment to
conserve the Makuleke region in perpetuity means that the land can‐
not be used for agriculture, mining, or mass settlement (see Table 1).
Other activities are allowed to the extent that they are compatible with
conservation; this compatibility is to be assessed by comparison with
the conservation management plan developed and agreed to by the
Joint Management Board comprised of representatives of the Maku‐
leke CPA and SANParks. Several measures ensure that maintaining
the Makuleke region as a conservation area will not pose a financial
burden to the Makuleke. For the first 5 years of co‐management, SAN‐

Figure 4: Makuleke Region Co‐Management Arrangement established in Land
Restitution Agreement.
Joint Management Board: 3 Makuleke CPA Members, 3 SANParks Members
Decision making: 2/3 of members from ea. group
Responsibilities: Compliance w/Restitution Agreement and Conservation Plan;
Conservation Policy

Makuleke Communal Property Association
(CPA)
Decision making: Majority vote of General
Meeting
Responsibilities: Commercial Development of
Makuleke Region & Allocation of Economic
Opportunities & Benefits

Makuleke Community
15,000 members of CPA

South African National Parks (SANParks)
Independent statutory body responsible for
management of National Protected Areas
Decision making: Bureaucratic
Responsibilities: Conservation Management
of Makuleke Region (residual authority)

Project Developers
Engaged for specific tasks or joint ventures

Table 2: Revenue and Cost‐Sharing Arrangement
Source
Gate Fees
Direct Operational
Management costs for
Pafuri Region

Commercial Revenue
Commercial Devel‐
opment Costs

Actor
SANParks receives; arrangement may be reconsidered
SANParks will bear for 5 years; Makuleke CPA may
contribute.
CPA will pay up to 50% of costs subsequently, but required
contribution may not exceed 50% of net profit, CPA may
contribute additional funds
Makuleke CPA receives income
Not specified in Agreement. The Makuleke CPA has
secured funding from following sources: Department of
Public Works; the Department of Arts, Culture, Science &
Technology; Department of Environmental Affairs &
Tourism; Department of Labor; Maputo Corridor
Company; GTZ Foundation; and the Ford Foundation,
among others

Parks was obligated to bear all operational costs. Subsequently, the
Makuleke CPA will pay up to 50 percent of these costs (See Table 2),
but the costs paid by the CPA may not exceed 50 percent of their net
profit from the region. Although SANParks retains the revenue from
the fees that visitors pay to enter the Park through Pafuri gate, which is
closest to the Makuleke region, as of 2001, SANParks’ operational costs
for the Makuleke region outweighed gate revenues (Reid 2001). In
practice, SANParks is obligated to subsidize continued conservation if
ecotourism ventures do not pay off.
The Makuleke have been expressly committed to conservation‐
based development since they initiated the land claim. In their public
statements during the land claim negotiations and subsequently,
community leaders have consistently argued that the community seeks
to use ecotourism as a means to development. The following state‐
ments are representative:
Since the area is now developed into a conservation area, we would
like it retained as such and not go and live there. The entire commu‐
nity feels strongly about this. We want to own the area but not live in
it. Lamson Maluleke, Makuleke community leader (M. Nel 1996)
If we can get land rights, we want to make use of resources so that the
community can benefit. One of the resources is eco‐tourism; we
would like to build some lodges to cater for overseas and local mar‐
kets. Livingstone Maluleke, Makuleke community leader (M. Nel 1996).

It is difficult to determine whether Makuleke commitment to conser‐
vation was truly voluntary or merely a pragmatic decision seeking to
strengthen their land claim given the political environment. 14 The Con‐
stitution establishes a right to redress, but not to restoration, and Land
Claims Court documents indicate that restoration without conserva‐
tion was unlikely. 15
Other benefits of the negotiated agreement are easy to see. Sym‐
bolically, the Makuleke gained the enormous victory of official recog‐
nition of the injustices against them. Legally, the Makuleke gained
formal title to the Makuleke region and exclusive rights to commer‐
cially develop the area in a manner consistent with conservation. The
CPA constitution states that the Makuleke Region is to serve as a
means towards achieving economic self reliance and development
(Makuleke CPA Constitution Section 5.4). Tourism ventures, such as

lodges, tours, and safari hunting, are the chief development strategy
the CPA has pursued. The agreement also strengthened the Maku‐
lekeʹs tenure security in Ntlhaveni; the Court Order and Agreement of‐
ficially acknowledge Makuleke residence in Ntlhaveni and oblige the
State to secure rights for the Makuleke in Ntlhaveni (Court Order, Sec‐
tion 19).
However, the legacy of poverty resulting from land dispossession
has had lasting effects on the Makuleke, and these effects were not
erased with the transfer of land title. Most CPA members live in
Ntlhaveni, which is one of the poorest regions in the poorest province
in South Africa (Koch & de Beer 2000). 16 To pursue their goal of tour‐
ism‐based development, the Makuleke have had to partner with out‐
side actors who possess material resources and/or necessary expertise.
To raise revenue from safari hunting, for example, the CPA partnered
with a private firm that advertised, organized, and managed the hunt.
The Makuleke have been quite effective at developing these useful
relationships. Since the mid‐1990s, a steady stream of volunteers and
NGOs such as the Legal Resources Center, Environmental Wildlife
Trust, the Ford Foundation, and the German Agency for Technical Co‐
Operation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fűr Technische Zusammenarbeit)
have assisted community members with a variety of tasks. However,
the risk of exploitation and unequal partnership is a continuing con‐
cern. The Makuleke CPA has had to rely on others for assistance in
gathering information and determining the options available at strate‐
gic decision points such as approaching the land claims negotiations,
ascertaining development options, developing a conservation man‐
agement plan, and issuing requests for development proposals. The
Makuleke may not always be able to tell if they are receiving full, fair,
and unbiased information. 17 While the risk of exploitation has declined
somewhat as the skills and experience of community members in‐
crease, early decisions may have lasting effects. Some participants in
the German‐funded Transform project assert that it initially hindered
the Makuleke’s land restitution claim by suppressing recognition of
conflicts of interests between SANParks and the community (Steenk‐
amp & Urh 2000). For several years, the Makuleke CPA worked closely
with several individuals whom Makuleke community leaders per‐
ceived to have no conflicts of interest. This loose grouping of individu‐
als was collectively called the Friends of Makuleke. The Friends were
most intensely involved with the Makuleke during the land claim ne‐

gotiations; involvement has lessened with the Friends’ perception that
the Makuleke had developed some capacity and should become self‐
sufficient. 18
The current resolution requires that the Makuleke Region is to re‐
main a conservation area in perpetuity. Because of this proviso, all
commercial ventures must be consistent with conservation. If the CPA
wishes to build a lodge, to extend a road, or to create a helipad, it must
be able to demonstrate these changes would not impede conservation.
In practice, this means that the CPA must present all commercial plans
to the Makuleke‐SANParks Joint Management Board, compare pro‐
posals with the conservation management plan, and conduct environ‐
mental impact assessments for each proposal. The CPA must justify its
decisions to SANParks, although SANParks’ ability to block ventures
is limited to environmental grounds. Technical expertise is an impor‐
tant resource in making these arguments about environmental impact,
but it is not equally distributed between the two co‐managers. Much of
the imbalance between SANParks and the CPA can be traced to past
state policies and resource allocations. In this respect, the Makuleke
are similar to many collectives targeted for participatory resource
management. Ecologically significant areas are often remote, and the
people living in them or dispossessed from them of are often politi‐
cally and economically marginal. Inequality is deeply sedimented in
the terrain on which communities and partners seek to develop con‐
servation projects.
Ntlhaveni was part of the Gazankulu “self‐governing” Bantustan.
Like others in the former homelands, the Makuleke face unresolved
conflict over authority and land tenure (Classens 2001; Ntsebeza 1999;
Turner & Ibsen 2000), threatening the already problematic notion of
coherent community. Although elected local governments have been
installed, the role of “traditional authorities” (chiefs) in postapartheid
South Africa has not yet been resolved. In many places it is not clear
who owns which land in the homelands, nor who possesses the au‐
thority to allocate land. It is not clear whether the recently enacted
Community Land Rights Act of 2004 will resolve these issues. 19 The
successful land claim strengthened the Makuleke’s tenure security in
Ntlhaveni, but conflict between Chief Mhinga, Chief Makuleke and
their adherents has continued.
Additionally, questions of community membership and coherence
remain salient. The Makuleke established formal membership criteria

and a communal property association in response to the requirements
of the land claim process, but the presence of formal membership defi‐
nitions should not be assumed to have created a unified collectivity.
As Agrawal and Gibson (1999) contend, communities are rarely ho‐
mogenous. If participation in natural resource management and tour‐
ism initiatives produces disparities in perceived benefits, it may in‐
crease communal tensions and conflicts. Since the land claim process
began, CPA executive members have been the locus of external efforts
to assist the Makuleke. They have received training, subsidized travel,
and other perks. These programs have helped Executive Committee
members to develop the skills necessary to make good decisions, but
they also placed these individuals in a favored position. In contrast,
the tangible benefits received by non‐executive CPA members as of
2002 were fairly small. After each safari hunt, animal meat was shared
among the community, and several dozen CPA members were hired to
work in the Makuleke Region. Perceived benefit disparities place se‐
vere pressures on the CPA Executive Committee. Research on other
cases suggests that disparities in benefit are common (Kellert, Mehta,
Ebbin & Lichtenfeld 2000).
Local decision‐making processes reflect multiple actors, multiple,
often conflicting, interests and local institutions. The 1996 Community
Property Association Act had two curious gaps: it ignores “traditional”
authority and customary law, and it makes no reference to local gov‐
ernment; these lacunae could facilitate deeply divisive contestation
over authority (Cousins & Hornby 2001). 20 The Makuleke have sought
to avoid conflict by creating informal linkages between the CPA and
traditional Authority; the Makuleke Chief and other members of the
royal family were elected to the CPA executive committee. Addition‐
ally, the Development Forum in Ntlhaveni brings together representa‐
tives from all the local organizations. These measures facilitate organ‐
izational communication and coordination, but they cannot prevent
conflict as the balance of resources controlled by different organization
shifts. The Makuleke CPA has enjoyed technical assistance and finan‐
cial support from several sources while the local government and civic
organizations’ financial resources have remained quite limited. Be‐
cause the CPA receives all revenue from development initiatives in the
Makuleke region, it may eventually control substantial resources. 21 Be‐
cause the CPA Executive Committee is an elective body, the shifts in
influence are likely to be expressed in increased contestation for posi‐

tions. In 2002, the executive committee was largely comprised of rela‐
tively well‐educated, employed individuals and members of the royal
family. While changes in membership could make the executive more
representative, it also could make it more difficult for the CPA to
maintain unity in its interactions with SANParks and other partners.

CAPITALISM AND MARKETS:
THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF
COMMUNITY‐BASED NATURE TOURISM
The shift to community‐based natural resource management has coin‐
cided with widespread adoption of sustainable development and mar‐
ket‐based conservation strategies (Hulme & Murphree 2001). Taken
jointly, this perspective implies that the route to successful CBNRM
goes through the market. This approach has some clear benefits. A
capitalist logic makes it possible to assign values to conservation and
to assess its costs and benefits. As discussed, conservation efforts have
imposed severe social, material, and economic costs on communities
subject to dislocation and use restrictions. There have been few efforts
to estimate these financial costs of fortress conservation. 22 Conversely,
conservation efforts have benefited individuals for whom conservation
has intrinsic value, people who have had access to protected areas, and
those able to mount related commercial enterprises. Economic logic
implies that if all parties were willing, those who benefit from conser‐
vation could compensate those individuals or groups who were ad‐
versely affected by conservation measures. This would benefit all par‐
ties involved. 23 This has not been the dominant strategy.
Instead, market‐based approaches to CBNRM have focused on
providing a stream of benefits to the participating community. Most
benefits originate from two sources: government or private sector
project funds and income from extractive or non‐extractive use of
protected areas. Organizational actors that support conservation often
are willing to subsidize initial organizational and project costs for
CBNRM. The Makuleke CPA has received grants from government
agencies, NGOs, and foreign foundations, and community members
have been hired to work on projects in Kruger Park. 24 These external
subsidies to the communities participating in conservation initiatives
are usually viewed as short term and unsustainable.

In the long run, revenue from natural resources is meant to serve as
the main source of community development. Communities are to
achieve development by putting nature on the market. The most sub‐
stantial sources of income from protected areas involve tourism.
Tourists are accustomed to paying for access to nature in nature, for
related services such as transportation, lodging, and guidance, and
purchasing goods and souvenirs linked to the experience such as post‐
cards and local crafts. These goods and services are, in principle, com‐
patible with conservation. While there is an established and lucrative
market for game hunting (Chardonnet et al. 2002), conservation prin‐
ciples and constituencies constrain the potential for profit. The conser‐
vation plan for the Makuleke Region permits limited hunting, but the
first elephant hunts in the Makuleke Region produced an outcry
among conservationists. In 2000, the Makuleke were able to sell the
rights to hunt two elephants and two buffalo. The hunt produced
R520,000 (about US$47 thousand or $3/beneficiary) and animal meat
(Mahony & Van Zyl 2001). Hunts also occurred in 2001 and 2002.
Superficial analysis suggests that tourism is a promising strategy.
Many African protected areas contain stunning landscapes, large
game, and exotic flora. Large numbers of people pay fees to enter ex‐
isting protected areas; more than a million people visited South Af‐
rica’s national parks in 1995 (Wells 1996). The tourism sector directly
accounts for 3.7 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP)
(World Travel and Tourism Council 2003b), and tourism comprises the
main source of foreign currency for at least thirty eight percent of all
countries (Roe & Urquhart 2001). In 1997, ten countries in continental
sub‐Saharan Africa garnered more than US$100 million in tourism re‐
ceipts (World Tourism Organization. 2002). In South Africa, tourism is
the third largest industry and the fourth most important source of for‐
eign exchange (Spenceley 2003); it comprises about 7 percent of GDP
(South Africa. Government Communications (GCIS) 2003). Although
few solid figures are available, it is clear that nature tourism generates
substantial revenue (Emerton 2001). Wells (1996) estimates that South
African nature tourism accounted for R710‐6,087 (US$225 to 1,909 mil‐
lion) in 1993. 25
Although these figures are promising, closer examination of the
economic logic regarding tourism, the sectoral attributes of tourism,
and the political economy within which CBNRM initiatives are situ‐
ated raises several concerns. First, community conservation tourism

initiatives are relatively new entrants to a large and competitive field.
In addition to the many state‐owned protected areas, there is a large
private nature tourism industry. Community initiatives will have to
compete with these public and private initiatives. Although some may
be able to find a market niche by highlighting community control or
ecotourism (see Honey 1999), it is not self‐evident that communities
are well placed to compete successfully.
Second, because the sites tourists select are influenced by interna‐
tional trends and events, even success may prove fleeting. For exam‐
ple, the events of September 11, 2001 led many travelers to re‐evaluate
the safety of different destinations. Observers suggest that South Af‐
rica has benefited from this re‐evaluation because the threat of terror‐
ism is believed to be low, but they worry that high crime rates will dis‐
courage foreign tourists (Spenceley 2003; World Travel and Tourism
Council 2003a). During the latter years of apartheid, sanctions and
boycotts limited travel to South Africa. Since the transition, interna‐
tional travel has increased, and the tourism sector has grown substan‐
tially. At present, tourism is the fastest‐growing sector (GCIS 2003).
While recent trends have benefited South Africa, tourism to Kenya and
Zimbabwe declined sharply over the same period as the bombing of
the US embassy and perceived domestic instability diminished their
attractiveness to foreign tourists. Tourist markets are highly sensitive
to international and national factors and events that are largely outside
the control of tourist sites and host communities.
Third, profitable tourism often requires substantial investment.
Although tourists often pay access fees, the larger share of revenue is
garnered through housing, transport, and tour management (Clancy
1998). Lodging is perhaps the simplest of these components for com‐
munities to provide, and it may range from local homestays to luxury
accommodation. If a community is located near the protected area,
lodging within the community may be feasible. Because Ntlhaveni is
about 200 kilometers away from the Makuleke Region, providing
lodging for visitors to the Region has less potential. Conservation con‐
cerns are likely to limit construction within the protected area. When
this is the case, low volume, high cost lodging may be more profitable.
One study of the Makuleke Region estimated that 5‐6 lodges could
produce US$360 to 540 thousand per year (Koch & de Beer 2000). 26 But
provision of independent accommodation is likely to require substan‐
tial financial investment up‐front. Oldham, Creemers and Rebeck

(2000) estimate that mid‐market nature lodges in KwaZulu/Natal in‐
vested R200 thousand per bed; the operating surplus was approxi‐
mately R9 thousand per year.
Communities engaged in CBNRM are unlikely to have sufficient
funds to set up these high‐cost tourism ventures on their own, and ex‐
isting state and nongovernmental partners often are unwilling or un‐
able to provide funds for profit‐oriented investment. To address this
situation, the Makuleke CPA has issued calls for private sector bids to
develop the region. Bid documents clearly state that the private part‐
ners will be responsible for financing any joint projects. Although
partners are expected to have a reasonable rate of return, they are also
required to implement their ventures in a manner that advances the
community. Ventures also must include provisos for the eventual
transfer of lodges built on Makuleke land to the CPA. Although this
strategy seeks to protect the Makuleke’s interests while advancing
their tourism initiative, it may also render the region less attractive to
investors. The Makuleke CPA reached an agreement with one partner,
Matswani Safaris, to build one high end lodge, a tent camp, and a mu‐
seum (Spenceley 2003). At 60 percent occupancy, the Makuleke CPA
would receive annual lodge rent of about $75,000. In July 2003, the
CPA announced an R45 million concessionary agreement with a dif‐
ferent partner, Wilderness Safaris, to build three luxury tented
lodges. 27 It is not clear whether other CBNRM sites will be sufficiently
attractive to garner this sort of investment.
Fourth, the structure of the tourism sector may make it difficult for
communities to capture substantial benefits. Tourism is a complexly
structured global industry. The hotel and transport sectors are highly
concentrated, and the majority of benefits accrue to the larger players
(Clancy 1998). Nature tourism is less likely to be controlled by the
largest transnational firms, but Emerton’s (2001) research indicates that
benefits often flow away from communities. The individuals or firms
that manage tours—arranging transportation, accommodation, guides,
and schedules—often capture much of the revenue. These agents are
often situated closer to potential tourists and have easier access to
them. Evidence also indicates that the most lucrative employment op‐
portunities—for example as safari leaders or lodge managers—are of‐
ten captured by outsiders, ostensibly on the basis of skills
(Murombedzi 2001; Sindiga 2000). As with lodging, some communities
may be able to build local employment requirements into their con‐

tracts with partners; the Makuleke CPA has adopted this approach.
Matswani Wilderness Safaris proposed to implement a vocational
training program so that Makuleke could serve as tour guides, hospi‐
tality staff, and managers. Additionally, several Makuleke youth are
participating in a training program sponsored by the Endangered
Wildlife Foundation. Training has included conservation management,
tourism, business, safari guidance, and Geographic Information Sys‐
tems (GIS) wildlife monitoring. The program relies heavily on distance
learning, with short intensive training sessions conducted in Ntlhaveni
or Kruger Park. This program has been in progress for several years
and is intended to lead to formal certification, but advancement has
been slow and some students dropped out.
There is reason to believe that tourist expectations may limit
movement away from common employment patterns in which local
people fill many of the lower level, lower paying jobs, but non‐local
people dominate the higher‐level better paying positions. Although
the “nature” tourists experience reflects a complex interaction between
biological and human labor (Moore et al. 2003), the experience is often
marketed and understood as a journey into the authentic and pristine
(Bruner & Kirshenblattgimblett 1994; Moore et al. 2003; Norton 1996).
The development of nature tourism in southern Africa has been deeply
racialized, and ventures into “wild” nature typically have been medi‐
ated by non‐local, “skilled,” usually white, guides assisted by local,
“unskilled” black laborers. 28 Disrupting these expectations may reduce
commercial success among white tourists, who appear to constitute the
majority at present (Wells 1996). 29
For most communities, engaging in nature tourism will involve de‐
veloping a new set of relationships with extra‐local actors on an un‐
even terrain. 30 Communities’ ability to negotiate the terms of their en‐
gagement will depend crucially on their position with regard to the
protected area and their relationships with other, better situated actors.
When communities hold title to the land or have secure, state‐recog‐
nized tenure, 31 they possess greater ability to determine how that area
will be used. When another party holds formal rights, the community
must rely on that actor to address its interests. Some of the largest
southern African CBNRM initiatives, such as Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE
program, have involved communal land. In many communal areas, ef‐
fective control over use of this land resides in community actors but
formal property rights are held by the state. While these property ar‐

rangements usually are rooted in colonial disregard for African land
tenure, postcolonial governments have not rectified the situation. This
lack of local property rights has made it more difficult for community
residents to benefit from tourism initiatives on these lands
(Murombedzi 2001). The ability to make credible threats to comply
with or sabotage arrangements also affects negotiating power. Re‐
gardless of land tenure, close ties between members of the community
and well‐positioned actors may help to lessen the imbalance between
the community and prospective private sector partners.
The Makuleke community is better situated than most communities
engaged in CBNRM tourism initiatives. This is primarily due to their
strong formal relationship to the Makuleke Region, a site recognized to
have ecological value and commercial potential. Because the Makuleke
CPA has title to the region and court‐recognized exclusive rights to
commercial development, any actor seeking to use the land must en‐
gage with them. Additionally, there is a formal co‐management
agreement between the Makuleke CPA and SANParks. Although the
Restitution Agreement is subject to continual re‐interpretation, it was
carefully crafted through negotiation and establishes clear expectations
and constraints for each partner (Reid, 2001). Finally, the Makuleke
have a strong network of supporters with media ties, technical exper‐
tise, and financial resources.

CBNRM IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMATION
The shift in conservation towards community based natural resource
management cannot be understood in isolation. Core aspects of the
CBNRM development model—such as reliance on the market—reflect
a broader change in the political and economic landscape. The rise of
CBNRM has coincided with the third wave of democratization and the
adoption
of
neoliberal
economic
policies
worldwide. 32
Democratization has produced substantial, but uneven political
transformations in many sub‐Saharan African countries (See Bratton
1998; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Fomunyoh 2001; van de Walle
2002). 33 Forty one of forty eight African states held competitive
multiparty elections between 1989 and 2000 (van de Walle 2003). South
Africa’s democratization has involved the formal deracialization of the
polity and the establishment of substantial constraints on government
action, reflected in the Bill of Rights. Democratization has strengthened

participation‐based arguments for CBNRM while simultaneously
undermining the rationale for directing resources towards
conservation, an area perceived to benefit only a small minority. In
South Africa, democratization has led to the deracialization of
protected area policies and impelled efforts to transform SANParks’
internal management and relationship with communities; these efforts
have met with mixed success (Cock & Fig 2002; Turner & Meer 2001).
Postapartheid legislation also has enabled some of the individuals and
communities displaced by conservation to seek redress.
Most African governments have adopted and partially imple‐
mented a set of policies intended to stabilize and liberalize the econ‐
omy (see van de Walle 2001). South Africa adopted neoliberal eco‐
nomic policies in 1996 with the adoption of the Growth, Employment,
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. 34 These policies, promoted by
international financial institutions and largely adopted in the context
of economic crisis, have included measures to cut government expen‐
ditures, privatize parastatal organizations, and reduce state interven‐
tion in markets. Many scholars argue the government’s commitment to
liberal economic policies has limited redistribution and restructuring
efforts in South Africa (Nattrass & Seekings 2001; Schneider 2000). For
example, the willing buyer willing seller approach to land reform al‐
lowed white land owners to refuse to sell and/or set very high prices
for their land, while adherence to fiscal constraints limited the funds
available for land reform (Hall 2004; Rugege 2004). In most economic
sectors, markets are much freer than they have been in the past. Dur‐
ing apartheid, white businesses benefited from direct and indirect sub‐
sidies, including restricted competition and low‐wage black labor sup‐
plied by people with few alternatives. New entrants to these markets
are competing against the beneficiaries of these policies, but current
government support for business ventures is more narrowly targeted
and seeks to conform to free‐market principles.
Economic liberalization also affects protected areas directly. In
South Africa as elsewhere, most state and provincial parks have not
been financially self‐supporting. The profits from Kruger National
Park helped to subsidize other parks, as did state funds. While state
subsidies for protected areas in Africa often have been severely inade‐
quate, African states did subsidize protected areas for several decades.
With liberalization, government subsidies for the operational costs of
state protected areas have been reduced or eliminated. Liberalization

also affects community‐owned areas. Firstly, African governments are
less willing to fund conservation efforts of any sort. Revenue con‐
straints make it less likely that government‐funded protected areas
will devote substantial resources to CBNRM or other community en‐
gagement efforts, which may be seen as a distraction from conserva‐
tion. Secondly, governments have begun to formally introduce market
incentives into state protected areas. Marketization of these protected
areas has included the privatization of some operations (such as food
concessions and lodge management) as well as increased efforts to
make these areas self financing. While tourism generates substantial
revenue and foreign exchange, much of the revenue generated by na‐
ture tourism in protected areas has gone into private hands, benefiting
the state only indirectly. As protected areas have been asked to cover
their own costs, state protected areas have become much more active
participants in the market for nature tourism. Many of these areas are
well‐known, partially subsidized, and extremely attractive to private
interests.
The coincidence of liberalization and CBNRM may put the interests
of CBNRM initiatives and state protected areas into conflict as each
competes for a growing but still limited number of nature tourists. It
may be difficult for CBNRM efforts to win this competition for tourists
and investors. When given the option of investing in a state protected
area or a CBNRM, many investors are likely to choose the state area
because…?. The Makuleke experience demonstrates that there is rea‐
son for concerns. Shortly after the Makuleke CPA issued its call for
private sector development proposals, SANParks announced that sev‐
eral sites in Kruger National Park were available to commercial tender
(Mahony & Van Zyl 2001; Spenceley 2003). Several of the parties that
had expressed interest in the Makuleke Region then withdrew their
bids. Although the Makuleke still received a few proposals, and
eventually was able to reach agreements with two private partners, the
competition with SANParks clearly reduced the Makuleke CPA’s
choice of partners and its negotiating leverage. It is unclear whether
SANParks’ timing was deliberate—officials are informed of Makuleke
plans through the Joint Management Board—or inadvertent, but it is
likely that similar situations will arise in other CBNRM tourism initia‐
tives.

CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to historicize community‐based natural resource
management and to place its tourism‐based development promises in
a broader political economic context. Analysis of the Makuleke case
suggests that relying on conservation‐based tourism for development
is a risky strategy. While tourism has substantial promise, community‐
based initiatives may not be well‐positioned to compete against state‐
supported protected areas and private ventures. In closing, I suggest
two considerations in moving forward.
First, communities participating in CBNRM frequently face an ex‐
tremely restricted set of options. The effects of economic liberalization
reach beyond protected areas, and these changes may diminish com‐
munity members’ livelihood alternatives. Liberalization measures of‐
ten have included reduction in government payrolls and reduced
spending on social programs and development. Additionally, the for‐
mal labor market has shrunk in many African countries. These changes
may mean that previous livelihood strategies no longer ensure sur‐
vival. While remittances from migrants working in South African
mines and factories supported many poor rural Southern African
households in the past, a shift towards capital‐intensive agriculture,
mining, and manufacturing has reduced the need for labor (Cassim,
Onyango, Skosana & Seventer n.d.; Makgetla 2004; Nattrass & Seek‐
ings 2001; Tapela & Omara‐Ojungu 1999). In this context, securing
guaranteed employment from tourism venture partners may provide
substantial benefits.
For those communities that can alter land status, careful considera‐
tion of the opportunity costs—or forgone opportunities–posed by con‐
servation is warranted (Emerton 2001). The value of these forgone op‐
portunities depends on the specific characteristics of the area that
would be used for nature tourism—such as its agricultural or mining
potential—and prospects for success in other ventures. For example, a
South African community deciding between a nature tourism venture
and a commercial farming business would need to consider land qual‐
ity, capacity to compete with established capital‐intensive white‐owned
commercial farms and the government’s focus on ‘emerging black
farmers’ who already have substantial capital (See Hall 2004; Jacobs
2003). 35 Because of the high levels of poverty in rural South African
communities, most ventures are likely to involve working with an ex‐

ternal partner (E. Nel & Binns 2000). 36 In all cases, actors should explic‐
itly consider the challenges and opportunities generated by nature
tourism.
Second, we should reconsider the rationale for community based
natural resource management. Proponents have argued that CBNRM
can provide both democracy and material benefit. In many cases, at‐
tention to material development has outweighed focus on democracy.
But CBNRM emerges from a conservation history deeply intertwined
with injustice, exclusion, and dislocation, and it is far from clear that a
materialist strategy can respond adequately to this legacy. Although
the Makuleke people I interviewed hope that the Makuleke Region
will improve their economic conditions, economic benefit is not the
only basis on which they judge success. All indicated that regaining ti‐
tle to their ancestral home was an immense symbolic achievement in‐
dependent of subsequent commercial success or failure. It was equally
evident that the conditions of engagement with SANParks mattered
immensely. The Makuleke CPA was explicitly empowered to make
commercial decisions; the scope of SANParks authority was limited.
This CBNRM initiative is based in explicit recognition of past injustice
and the partners are now able to meet on somewhat equal ground. Ul‐
timately, these factors, rather than economic development, may prove
the determinant of CBNRM “success.”

NOTES
Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley
(rlturner@berkeley.edu). The author would like to thank the members of the
Makuleke community, SANParks staff, and Friends of the Makuleke who
shared their views with her.
2 Protected areas are places in which the state or the owner has imposed re‐
strictions on the use of land and other natural resources to advance conserva‐
tion.
3 Human geographers have demonstrated that the “local” is a product of
interactions at multiple scales. I use extra‐local here to refer to actors and dy‐
namics beyond the formal territorial boundaries of the “community” involved
in CBNRM, such as national government agencies, foreign donors, and private
1

tourism ventures. Extralocal processes include conservation management
fashions, global tourism trends, democratization, and economic liberalization.
4 Community interviews included a mix of leaders—customary authorities,
elected officials, and officials of local organizations—, elders, and young peo‐
ple. To protect informants’ confidentiality, I do not identify the individuals
interviewed by name.
5 Archives consulted include those of the Makuleke Communal Property
Association, the Department of Land Affairs/ Land Claims Commission, South
African National Parks and Kruger National Park.
6 On December 12, 2001, 1 US dollar = 11.0849 South African Rand.
7 By sectoral attributes, I mean such characteristics as the nature of
commodity (tourism is an experiential good), the production and consumption
process, and the market structure (Shafer, 1994).
8 My discussion of Makuleke history draws primarily from Harries (1987)
and that of Kruger Park draws from Carruthers (1995).
9 The Transvaal Republic was one of four colonies united to create the
modern South African state in 1910.
10 The cordon sanitaire was an area heavily patrolled by the South African
government in an attempt to control movement across borders.
11 By the end of August 2004, the land reform programs had transferred
roughly 3,500,000 million hectares, or about 4 percent of South Africaʹs com‐
mercial agricultural land (Umhlaba Wethu: a quarterly bulletin tracking land re‐
form In South Africa, 2004). The distribution of land in South Africa remains
highly unequal. Land reform in South Africa is a highly contentious issue, and
the governmentʹs approach has been criticized by many academics and civil
society organizations (Greenberg, 2004; Hall, 2004; Program on Land and
Agrarian Studies. University of the Western Cape, 2004; Zimmerman, 2000).
Since 2001, the level of social mobilization around land issues has increased,
and some groups have occupied land. To my knowledge, the Makuleke did
not use extralegal tactics to pursue their land claim. While the government has
taken steps to improve the speed of redistribution, it has not revised its basic
approach.
12 The terms of the settlement are established in the “The Main Agreement
Relating to the Makuleke Land Claim (as amended 11‐13 December 1998)”,
which was incorporated into the Order of the Land Claims Court. Throughout
the paper, this agreement is referred to as the “Restitution Agreement.”

Contractual parks are part of the national parks system, but they remain
under private ownership. A contract between the state and the owner sets the
terms of park access and control. The Restitution Agreement allows either
party to request the exclusion of the Makuleke Region from Kruger Park after
20 years on 5 years written notice.
14 While most of the community members interviewed in 2002 expressed
similar sentiments, some community elders who remembered living in the
Makuleke region expressed a strong desire to return.
15 The Court Judgment states, “The restrictive conditions of title which the
parties have agreed should be imposed were material in convincing the Court
that it was appropriate to order restoration in this matter” (Section 17).
16 In 1997, approximately 78 percent of households earned less than R1500
(~$135) per month, and a large number of households depended on low‐wage
employment in Kruger Park (Reid, 2001). On average, there were eight people
per household.
17 Parks officials, who cannot be considered neutral, frequently asserted in
interviews that the Makuleke were being used.
18 Several Friends of Makuleke expressed this view in interviews. Also see
Steenkamp (2001).
19 The Act provides legal recognition to communal land and allows for the
transfer of title from the state to communities and individuals, but also facili‐
tates continued control of communal lands by traditional councils (Rugege,
2004). This act went through at least ten drafts and nearly a decade of debate
before its passage. Because land administration by traditional councils may in‐
hibit womenʹs access to land, it is likely that the Act will be subject to constitu‐
tional challenge.
20 While some observers of the Makuleke community in the period prior to
the resolution of the land claim and shortly thereafter depict the community as
unified, others saw conflict and tension (Poonan, 2002; Reid, 2001; Steenkamp
& Urh, 2000).
21 As of 2002, the majority of funds remained unspent while the CPA estab‐
lished a separate trust to receive and manage funds. Some money had been
allocated for transport for the chief and community projects.
22 Studies assessing the opportunity costs of protected areas have found
that there are substantial costs to local communities, relative to their income,
which weigh most heavily on the poorest members of the commu‐
nity.(Emerton, 1999a, 1999b; Ferraro, 2002; Norton‐Griffiths & Southey, 1995).
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This approach seems most likely to meet with success in cases where the
affected party was not subjected to coercion. For many groups subject to
forced removal, financial compensation without restoration may be unaccept‐
able.
24 Supporters include the Department of Arts, Culture, Science & Technol‐
ogy; Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism; Department of Labor;
Department of Public Works; Maputo Corridor Company; the German Agency
for Technical Co‐Operation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fűr Technische Zusam‐
menarbeit; and the Ford Foundation,
25 The wide range reflects different assumptions about the relative impor‐
tance of wildlife tourism.
26 These estimates are based on total lodge capacity of 200 guests, paying
high prices, an 8 percent levy on turnover, and 50 percent occupancy. Each
lodge would employ 30 full‐time workers. Compare to Oldham, Creemers,
and Rebeck (2000).
27 Press releases and news coverage provide too few details for a thorough
assessment of this agreement, the Wilderness Safaris managing director stated
that the Makuleke would receive a percentage of turnover, rather than a flat
rental fee, community members would receive training and employment (up
to
200
jobs),
and
some
scholarships
would
be
provided.
(http://www.aboutravel.co.za/FRONTEND/A_SCRIPTS/article.asp?pklArticleI
D=2592&pklIssueID=322)
28 Like “nature,” racial categories also are the product of social and histori‐
cal processes; The interplay between race and nature in tourist sites deserves
closer attention (For some points of departure, see Dunn, 2004; Moore et al.,
2003).
29 Wells (1996) estimates that whites constituted 69 percent of domestic
tourists in South Africa in 1992. The proportion of non‐white South African
tourists is expected to rise substantially. The majority of extra‐regional tourists
to Africa are from Europe. Regional tourism comprises a plurality of non‐do‐
mestic tourists, but there are few good statistics on the characteristics of those
tourists.
30 While most CBNRM communities are deeply embedded in extra‐local
relationships, CBNRM initiatives have been heavily shaped by states and non‐
governmental organizations. Institutional ties with the private, for profit actors
that dominate tourism are likely to be weak.
23

In South Africa, the relationship to the land over which animals travel is
crucial as the law does not permit ownership of wildlife.
32 In the democratization literature, the “first wave” of democratization be‐
gan in the 19th century as many countries transitions from oligarchic régimes
to democratic ones in which a large proportion of the adult population could
vote. The “second wave” took place after the Second World War as a large
number of countries in Europe and throughout the world formally adopted
democracy. The “third wave” is said to have begun in the mid‐1970s as a
number of authoritarian régimes broke down and were replaced by democra‐
cies in southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, East Asia and sub‐Saharan Africa.
33 Countries with large nature tourism sectors—such as South Africa,
Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe—have a mixed record on democ‐
ratization.
34 Some scholars see South Africa’s path as somewhat divergent because
state leaders had greater choice about whether to adopt adjustment and liber‐
alization policies (See Fairfield, 2002; Habib & Padayachee, 2000).
35 Norton‐Griffiths and Southey (1995) used data regarding land potential
and returns to farming in livestock production in Kenya to assess the opportu‐
nity costs of conservation. Norton‐Griffiths and Southey (1995) used data re‐
garding land potential and returns to farming in livestock production in Kenya
to assess the opportunity costs of conservation; several protected areas were in
high potential areas. Additionally, unemployment among rural Kenyans was
low. They found that the opportunity costs of conservation in this context,
taking nature tourism into account, were substantial.
36 There is a growing literature that provides ideas for structuring partner‐
ships in ways that maximize community benefit (See, for example, Mayson,
2003; Nicanor, 2001; Spenceley & Seif, 2003).
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